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Summary  findings
Ingco evaluates the progress in agricultural liberalization  In several countries, the distortion  effects are
- and the welfare effects for least-developed and net  significantly larger than the terms-of-trade effects. In
food-importing  countries - as a result of agricultural  some cases, the distortion effects work in opposition  to
price shocks resulting from the Uruguay Round. She  the terms-of-trade effects and are large enough to reverse
finds that:  the sign of the net welfare change.
* The changes in welfare are significantly affected by  In short, removing poLicy  distortions could convert the
the structure of trade and distortions in the domestic  small ioss in terms of trade to potential gains. But many
economy.  least-developed, net food-importing  countries did not
- Although many economies are hurt by increases in  use the Round to support domestic efforts at trade
world prices, losses in terms of trade are small relative to  reform. As most studies show, most  gains from
total GDP. Only in a few countries does thie  estimated  multilateral liberalization come from the countries' own
welfare change constitute more than 1 percent  of GDP.  liberalization efforts, so countries that failed to liberalize
their trade policy lost the opportunity  for gains.
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The least-developed  and  net-food importing developing countries' continue to  raise
concerns  that greater liberalization  of trade in agriculture  resulting  from the implementation  of the
Uruguay Round Agreement  (URA) will adversely  affect them. The 1996 Singapore  Ministerial
Declaration  reiterates the need for a plan of action and to monitor the Marrakesh Ministerial
Decision  on measures  to counter  any adverse  effects  of the reform  program.
The effects of trade liberalization  under the URA for developing  countries have been
expressed in various fora.  While substantial  real income gains for developing  countries are
predicted  from the Agreement,  potential welfare  losses are estimated  for some least-developed
regions.  For instance,  studies by Harrison, Rutherford  and Tarr (1995) and Goldin  and van der
Mensbrugghe  (1995)  show that the overall  welfare  effect  of the URA on Sub-saharan  Africa as a
whole  is estimated  at a loss of  between  $1.2 and $1.8 billion (in 1992 dollars)  or between  0.9 or
1.2  percent  of GDP. The measured  loss reflects  a number  of factors,  including  the rise in prices of
major  food imports,  increases  in the prices  of imported  textile  and clothing  products  and the lack of
own  liberalization  in the region. More  than  half of the estimated  welfare  loss were attributed  to the
adverse  terms-of-trade  effects.
The analysis  in this paper complements  previous  studies  by evaluating  welfare  changes  at
the country  level  in selected  least-developed  countries.  The analysis  focuses  on the welfare  effects
of agricultural  price changes  taking into account  the trade and domestic  agricultural  distortions  in
the economy. The diversity  in country-by-country  trade characteristics  and structure of policy
distortions  indicate important  variations in the nature of welfare changes  at the country level.
Given  the world  price change,  the effects  depend  on the structure  of distortions  and on their trading
position in the import-competing  and exportable commodities  affected by liberalization. The
progress in agricultural  trade liberalization  resulting from the implementation  of the agreement
since  the completion  of the Round  is discussed.
1 The  least-developed  countries  include  those recognized  by the  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Council
(countries with per  capita  income below US$1070)  and developing countries which  notified to the World Trade
Organization their status  as  net-food importers.  As of November,  1996, these  includes  Barbados,  Cote d'Ivoire,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Peru, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela.
1Because of the relatively  small predicted  changes  in agricultural  prices,  it is generally
expected  that the welfare  effects will be small (relative  to GDP). However,  the analysis  is still
usable  in providing  further  empirical  evidence  about  the significance  of domestic  policy  distortions
in  evaluating the nature of welfare effects of multilateral trade liberalization  on individual
countries. By analyzing  the welfare  changes  at the country  level,  the analysis  provides  information
about  the country-by-country  situation.
The welfare  analysis  follows  the methods  developed  by Anderson  and Neary (1992, 1994)
and Anderson  (1996).  Following  the Balance  of Trade Function approach, welfare measures
comprising  of terms-of-trade  effects  and so-called  "distortion  effects"  are estimated. According  to
the terms-of-trade  effect  assessment  of welfare  changes, each 1% increase  in import  price adds  to
the compensation  required  to maintain  real income  constant  at a rate equal to the import share of
base expenditure. For example, a 10% increase in the price of an import taking up 10% of
national  expenditure  will cause  a compensation  requirement  equal  to 1% of national  income.  If this
is not met, a welfare  loss  equal to 1%  of real  income  is incurred.
However,  the overall  welfare  effect is influenced  by the nature of initial  policy  distortions.
In many least-developed  countries, governments  tend to  heavily tax producers and provide
widespread  food  price subsidies  to consumers.  Food  imports  are usually  sold at prices  significantly
below  world  prices. In contrast,  producers  in some countries  who  had been  taxed in the 1970s  and
early 1980s now receive subsidies  because producer prices have been set above world levels.
Despite the structural adjustments  and policy reforms during the 1980s, important distortions
remain in these countries. Hence, the countries' trade patterns are due to these distortionary
policies. In cases where food imports are heavily subsidized,  Anderson  (1996) showed  that the
result  that net food  importers  lose from  liberalization  may be reversed. This is because  an increase
in food prices results in a reduction of an activity which is actually inefficiently  large--viz.  its
marginal  social cost is above  the willingness-to-pay  of consumers.  The substitution  effect creates
an offset  to the terms-of-trade  effects,  which  can be large  enough  to reverse  the direction  of welfare
impacts. In other words, if imports are explicitly  or implicitly  subsidized,  an increase in world
prices which causes imports to fall may reduce expenditures  on import subsidies sufficiently  to
raise overall  welfare.
Due to data limitations,  the more comprehensive  welfare  measures  (including  distortion
effects) are estimated  for only 14 countries where data on trade and domestic distortions  are
available. However,  the first-order  welfare  measures  (terms-of-trade  effects)  are estimated  for 54
2countries. While only partial, the first-order  welfare  measures  provide  usable information  about
the terms-of-trade  effects  for a wide number  of countries. Some  qualitative  information  about  the
nature of distortions  in several  of these countries  are used to infer about the distortion  effects.
Consistent with Anderson's (1996) findings, the results provide fiurther  evidence about the
importance  of distortion  effects  in the overall welfare change.  In several  countries,  the distortion
effects works in opposition  to the terms-of-trade  effects; and in a number  of cases, sufficiently
large  to offset  the terms-of-trade  loss.
II.  MEASURING WELFARE EFFECTS
To facilitate  the interpretation  of results, the approach  in welfare  measurement  is briefly
described  in this section. The approach  follows  the most common  framework  using the Balance  of
Trade Function.  The theoretical  underpinnings  of the Balance  of Trade Function  are discussed  by
Anderson  and Neary (1992, 1994) and compared  with other welfare measures  by Martin, et.al.
(1994, 1996). The brief discussion  below  is based on the analysis  by Anderson  (1996) and Martin
(1996). Similar  notations  are used to aid the discussion. Given  a vector  of goods  traded in world
markets  at external  prices  p* and sold  domestically  at  prices  p,  the Balance  of Trade Function  for
a representative  agent  economy  is defined  as follows:
(1)  B(p,p*,u)  =  e(p,u) - (p-p*)' z  (p,u).
where  B indicates  the welfare  measure  with  utility  fixed  exogenously  at initial  level u; e is the trade
expenditure  function and zp is the trade vector, by Shephard's Lemma A subscript denotes
differentiation,  except  when index variables i, j  are used.  In other words, zp is a vector of
(compensated)  net imports/exports,  and the subscript  p denotes  the first derivative  with respect  to
domestic  prices. The term (p-p*)  is interpreted  as the tariffs or tariff equivalent  of the prevailing
trade distortions  in the economy. The trade vector has positive  elements  for imports  and negative
elements  for exports.  Given  p* and a fixed policy (p-p*), the equilibrium  level of utility, u, is
determined  by the balanced  trade  requirement  specified  by setting B( ) equal  to zero.  The welfare
effects  of changes  in external  prices of traded goods  p* is derived  by estimating  the change  in the
foreign  exchange  required  to maintain  the same  level  of utility  u with the new  price  p  *.  Assuming
no change  in the policy vector (p-p*), the change  in p* passes fully through to p,  the welfare
change  is estimated  as follows:
3(2)  Bp*  =  zp'-  (P-P*)'zp.
The ith element  of the row  vector  Bp*  is specified  as:
(3)  Bi  =  Zi  - (p-p*) _ZiLp.
Based on equation  (3), a local approximation  to the welfare  change  of a set of price changes as a
proportion  of  GDP  (y ) is derived  by Anderson  (1996)  using a Taylor  series  expansion  as follows:
1  PA  iPi  +  (  )Zj  azP  A
E yBi  Pi =  E  yPii  + I  (Pj  - P.  ) Zi  1  ap  Pi
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where  t1 denotes  the ad-valorem  tax on good  j, (pj -p*j)/pj and  eij denotes  the elasticity  of import
demand  j with  respect  to price i. The  equation  says  that the percentage  change  in real income  due to
the external  price changes  is equal to  the terms  of trade effect, the first term, plus the distortion
effect, the second  term. The terms of trade effect is equal  to the sum of the trade shares times the
percentage  changes  in external  prices. The second  term is the standard  dead  weight  loss term and
are estimated given the additional information  on general equilibrium  elasticities and on the
structure  of distortions  in the economy.
To further aid understanding,  a graphical  measure of the welfare  effects represented  in
equation (4) are derived. Given an increase  in world prices from  po* to pi  *  the graphical
measures  are derived  in Martin (1996) using a second-order  Taylor series approximation  of the
Balance  of Trade  Function  as follows:
(5)  B, - Bo = [ zp - (p-p*)  zpp]  (p, * -po*) + 1/2 (pi *-po*) zpp  (pi*-po*)],
= [zp (Pi * -Po*)]  - [(P-P*)  zpp  (Pi * -Po*)]  +[1/2  (pi  *-po*)  zpp (pl*-po*)]
where each subscript  p denotes  the derivative  of the relevant  function  with respect to a particular
price; zpp  refers  to the derivative  of the compensated  excess  demand  function  at the initial  utility
level.  If the initial  tariff level  were zero,  the equation  will  consist  of two terms.  First,  the term
[Zp (pO*  - pi*)]  measures  the terms of trade loss resulting from an increase in world prices of
4imports  or a fall in the world  price of exports. The second,  quadratic  term measures  the extent  to
which the terms-of-trade  losses are reduced by the substitution  of domestically  produced  goods
for more expensive  imported  goods, or the diversion  of  goods previously  exported  to domestic
markets. In this first-best  case,  the formula indicates that the welfare  effects  of the changes in
world  prices will  depend  on the sign of the first-order  term, zp. That is, whether  the goods  whose
price changes  are  imports  or exports. In cases of non-zero  initial  tariffs, the second  term indicating
the loss  in tariff  revenue  resulting  from reduced  import  must also be considered.
Equation (5) is illustrated  graphically  in Figure 1. The welfare  effects are identified  to
include  the areas abc, bcde and gidf. The area abc represents  the welfare  triangle  associated  with
replacement  of  imported commodities  with now cheaper domestically  produced goods, and
correspond  to the quadratic  term in equation (2).  The area ajih (=bcde)  represents  the loss of
tariff revenues resulting from reduced import volumes (the term (p -p*) zpp  (p, * -po*)) in
equation  (2). As pointed  out by Anderson  (1996)  and Martin (1996),  this component  is important
for distorted  economies. The area gidf is the income  loss resulting  from  the terms of trade decline
brought  about  by the rise in world prices, defined by  zp (p,* - po*).  The areas  ajih and gidf
both reflect welfare  losses,  while  the area  abc reflects  an efficiency  gain.
Figure  1. Welfare  Effects  of an  Increase  in World  Prices
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5III.  RESULTS
A.  PROGRESS  IN  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE LIBERALIZATION 2
The Uruguay Round achieved a  great deal by  bringing agriculture under  GAIT
disciplines. New rules were developed  to control import barriers, export subsidies,  and the total
level of support  to agriculture. However,  the implementation  of individual  country  commitments,
while maintaining  consistency  with the new rules appears to  be managing trade more than
liberalizing  trade.  Based on the estimates of pre- and post-URA trade distortions and the
implementation  of market access commitments  in 1995-96,  the progress in trade liberalization
remains  limited  and uneven  across  countries. Restrictions  on market access  remain  substantial  and
domestic  markets  in many developing  countries  continue  to be largely isolated from world price
movements. Since the completion  of the Round in 1993, only a small  part  of  the  agreed
liberalization has  taken place.The following section briefly reviews the  new  rules,  their
implementation  and the progress  in post-URA  agricultural  trade liberalization.
Tariffication and Minimum Access.  The most significant  aspect of the UR agreement  on
agriculture  was a change  in the rules regarding  market  access.  The agreement  mandates,  except in
cases of "special  treatment,- 3 to (i) replace  non-tariff  barriers with tariffs; (ii) bind all tariffs and
tariff equivalents 4; (iii) reduce  tariffs by 36 percent 5 over six years in industrial  countries,  and by
24 percent over ten years in  developing countries; and  (iv) to  establish minimum access
commitments  at 3 percent of 1986-88 consumption,  rising to 5 percent (2 to  4 percent for
developing  countries)  at the end of implementation  period.
Export Subsidies. Participating countries accepted binding commitments  on maximum  export
subsidization  (Article 3), leading to  an agreed reduction in expenditures  on export subsidies
(industrial  countries  by 36 percent and developing  countries  by 24 percent) and reduction  in the
2  The  evaluation  of  agricultural  reforms  agreed  in  the  Uruguay  Round  and  the  extent  of  agricultural  trade
liberalization  actually  achieved are examined in detail in Ingco (1995), Hathaway  and Ingco (1995),  and IATRC
(1994).
3Special treatment was allowed on commodities which met the following conditions: (i) commodities that are major
staples in the diet, (ii) imports are less than 3 percent of domestic consumption in the base period, and (iii) no export
subsidies have been provided.  In return,  minimum  access levels  were required  to be introduced  at 4  percent  of
domestic consumption rising  to 8 percent  over the implementation  period  of the Round.  The principal  cases of
special treatment were rice imports in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines.
4The commitment to the maximum tariff that can be applied at the border.  This means that countries can apply tariffs
at or below the bound maximum,  but commit themselves not  to raise  tariffs  above that,  without renegotiating  in
GAIT  and compensation given to affected trading partners.
5 Based on simple, unweighted averge.
6quantity  of subsidized  exports  ( industrial  countries  by 21 percent and developing  countries  by 14
percent) over the implementation  period. 6 The new rules on export subsidies  under the Round,
while  important,  were not as sweeping  as those in market  access,  in that the Round  did not outlaw
export  subsidies  but only imposed  linmits  on their application.
Domestic  Support. New  limits were  established  on the aggregate  level of trade-distorting  domestic
agricultural  support. Based on fixed external  prices in the base period (1986-88),  the agreement
specifies  the determination  of the Aggregate  Measure of Support (AMS) and requires  developed
countries  to reduce  their total AMS by 20 percent  (13.33 percent  in developing  countries)  over the
implementation  period. Individual  commodity  support  is not limited  except  that if support  exceeds
the  1992 level. For several reasons, these concessions on domestic support reductions are
considerably  less effective  than those of border measures.'  First, the constraint on aggregate,
rather than commodity  specific support, leaves much scope for continued  support policies and
domestic  policy action on particular commodities.  Second, the "green box" 8 will allow many
policies  to continue  unreduced  in participating  countries.  Last, the AMS calculations  are based on
the outlays during 1986-88, which was a period of relatively  low world prices for agricultural
products  and generally  high expenditures  on domestic  support  to farmers.
B.  ESTIMATES OF PRE- AND  POST-URA  IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
Previous studies (Ingco, 1995; Hathaway and Ingco, 1996) have examined  the ways in
which individual  countries  took liberties with the generalized  rules of the GATT agreement  in
tabling their tariff commitments. Ingco (1995) found that countries  took liberties  in converting
former  quantitative  restrictions  to tariff equivalents,  with the result  that non-tariff  restrictions  were
replaced  by very high over-quota  tariffs, which  in many cases  has effectively  limit  trade in 1995  to
the minimum  access  quota  levels and in some  cases, allow  the country  to insulate domestic  prices
from world prices. Most developing  countries took an option that allowed them to  bypass
tariffication  of non-tariff  barriers and merely  declared  bound tariffs for products where  non-tariff
barriers had been used. While several developing  countries in Latin America and East-Asia
6Six years for industrial countries and ten years for developing countries.
7See Ingco (1995) and Hathaway and Ingco (1996) for detailed discussion.
8This includes general services involving expenditures  which provide services and do not involve direct payments
such as research, pest and disease control, training, extension, marketing and promotion,  and infrastructure  services.
These measures shall not involve price support to farmers.  In developing countries, government measures  to promote
agricultural  and rural development  such as investment  subsidies, input  subsidies  provided to low income farmers
(cash or kind) are exempted.
7committed  to bind tariffs at relatively  low levels  (less than 30 percent),  many countries  in Africa
and South Asia declared  very high (over 100-200  percent)  bound tariffs for agricultural  products.
Overall,  the choice  of the base period (1986-88),  combined  with excessive  or "dirty"  tariffication,
and the use of  very high "ceiling"  bindings  in developing  countries  contributed to  the limited
progress  in actual  liberalization  achieved.
Figure 2 summarizes  the average tariff equivalents  of non-tariff  measures  in agriculture
(applied rates in 1979-93)  and the average bound tariff rates agreed in the Uruguay Round in
selected  countries.  As shown in Figure 1, many of the post-UR  tariffs in agriculture  resulting
from the tariffication process are very high  and, while they will be  reduced during the
implementation  period, will remain very high in many countries.  Developing  countries were
allowed  to convert  unbound  tariffs  into "ceiling  bindings"  unrelated  to previous  rates of protection.
Many countries availed of this option and chose to use rates well above those that previously
applied.  The pattern of tariff commitments  for developed  and developing  countries  are broadly
similar,  in that the tariff bindings  resulting  from  the Round  are often  higher  than the average  rates
of protection  applied  prior to the completion  of the Round. The very high tariff bindings  and the
continuation  of state-trading  enterprises  with the power  to charge  "mark-ups"  in combination  with
tariff quotas, or  with monopoly  control of imports and exports, would limit the extent of
liberalization  achieved  from the Agreement.  If countries chose to use their option to set  high
tariffs, the costs  to these countries  could  be large.
C.  ESTIMATES  OF  AGRICULTURAL  PRICE  CHANGES
Numerous  studies were carried out during the course of the negotiations  on the potential
impact of agricultural  liberalization  on world prices and  trade. To motivate and guide policy
reform,  analysts  evaluated  the impacts of complete  and several  stylization  of partial liberalization
based on assumed percentage  reductions in applied protection. 9 However, as the details of
implementation  of  final commitments  of GATT member countries  became known,  it  became
evident that  previous stylization  of liberalization  have been optimistic  compared  to the actual
extent  of liberalization  achieved.
The most recent estimates  of  price impacts  of the Uruguay  Round  agreement  are shown
in Table 2.  The  results reflect  the complete  impact  of the UR agreement  after the reforms have
9Excellent  summaries  are found  in Vald6s (1987);  Goldin, Knudsen,  and van der Mensbrugghe  (1993) and BrandAo
and Martin (1993).
8been completely phased-in, and  therefore incorporates the  long-run supply  and  demand
adjustments  that  will result from  the  liberalization  process. The predicted  changes  in world
prices are relative  to  the numeraire,  which  is the price of OECD  manufacturing  exports. Given
the long-run nature of  the policy reforms, the studies focused on the impact on the long-ran
average level of prices, rather than on short-run  year-to-year  price changes.  The changes  are
specified  as percent deviations  from the benchmark  levels  at the close  of  implementation  period.
Brandao  and Martin (1993) and Goldin,  Knudsen,  and van der Mensbrugge  (1993) both
utilized the Rural-Urban  North-South  (RUNS) model developed  by the OECD and the World
Bank,  with different  stylization  of partial liberalization  in agriculture. The results in column  1 by
Brandao and Martin (1993) assumed  trade  liberalization  along  the lines of the Dunkel (GAYT,
1991) proposal, where only positive  protection  was reduced  by 36 percent for import protection
and by 20  percent for domestic  support.  The results  in column  2 by Goldin,  Knudsen  and van der
Mensbrugghe  (1993)  refer to an experiment  in which all agricultural protection (positive  or
negative, domestic  or border)  was  reduced by 30 percent for all commodities  in all regions
(including  regions which are not currently  members  of  the GATT/WTO.  i°  The price changes
estimated  by Brandao  and Martin (1993) are broadly similar to the estimates  by Goldin, et al
(1993), except for several commodities  (rice, coffee, and dairy products) where the absence of
discipline  in negative  protection  in the Dunkel  package scenario  resulted  in larger price increases.
In both studies, dairy, sugar, beef  and wheat are the commodities  for which the largest price
increases  are observed,  reflecting  the  high levels  of protection  in the OECD countries.
The most recent World Bank analyses of the Uruguay Round (Goldin and van der
Mensbrugghe,  1995; Harrison, Rutherford  and Tarr, 1995;  Hertel, Martin, Yanagishima  and
Dimaranan,  1995)  utilized  the detailed  evaluation  of final commitments  in agriculture  carried out
by Ingco (1995).  Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe  (1995) also consider non-agricultural
liberalization in  the  new  simulations; thus,  including the  considerable liberalization of
manufacturing  protection  which  raises world  import  demand  and the average  price of OECD  price
of  manufacture  exports, the  deflator of  agricultural  prices used in the RUNS model. These
l°If a country  protections its agriculture,  this involves a 30 percent reduction in import tariffs or a  30 percent
reduction  in export  subsidies. If a country  is taxing  agriculture,  Goldin,  et al. assumed  a 30 percent reduction  in its
import subsidy  or a 30 percent  reduction  in its export  tax. The reduction  in the tariff equivalent  is assumed  to occur
entirely  in the year 1993,  and the new  rate is held constant  for the rest of the simulation  period  at the lower level. All
agricultural  input subsidies  are reduced  by 30 percent.
9factors  combined result in smaller  estimated  price impacts due to the Round than those obtained
in earlier  studies.
Because of the inherent difficulty  in identifying  the true counterfactual  rate of protection
in the absence of the Round, analyses  based on alternative  assumptions  are presented  In the
simulations  by Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe  (1995)",  the extent of liberalization  was
estimated  by comparing  the final tariff binding  at the end of the Round's implementation  process
with a benchmark rate of  assistance  based on average  applied rates of  protection prevailing
before  the conclusion  of the Round. Liberalization  is estimated to occur only if the final rate is
below  the previously  applied  rate.  The results in column  3 (scenario  I)  are based on a reference
scenario  which assumes  as a benchmark  level of protection  (through  2002) the long run average
level of protection  (1979-93). The  latter, as a measure  of the true counterfactual,  is appropriate  if
the expected  rate of protection  in the absence  of the Round  is considered  to be constant. The long
run average smoothes  out the high variability  in measured  rates of  protection (mainly due to
volatile world prices). However, this scenario does not consider  the recent structural change
resulting from unilateral liberalization  in developing  countries. Given the uncertainty in  the
counterfactual,  the empirical  results are only indicative  of the effects  of reforms from historically
observed  levels of  protection,  rather from the unknown  rates of protection that would have
prevailed  in the absence  of the Round.
The results in column  4 (scenario  It) considers  the trends and structural change  in recent
years by  assuming  as a counterfactual  the average  protection  in a more  recent period  (1989/90-
1993).  In general, wheat, dairy, sugar, and meat products are the commodities  for which the
largest price  increases  are  observed,  reflecting  the high levels of protection  in these commodities  in
the OECD  countries. The greater  liberalization  in OECD  countries  in Scenario  II lead to sharper
supply  response  than in Scenario  I, resulting  in the higher price changes  for these commodities.
Based on Scenario  II of  RUNS (1995), the actual results of the final UR commitments  might
increase  prices  in 2002 by 3.8% in wheat,  2.3%  in coarse  grains,  and 1.8%  in sugar. At the same
time, world prices of some major imports such as other foods (-1.4%), rice (-0.9%), coffee (-
1.5%), tea (-1.4%), and cotton (-1.2%) are predicted  to decline. These percentage  changes in
"1The quantitative  evaluation  of the Uruguay  Round by Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe  (1995)  incorporates  the
impact  of tariffication  and export  subsidy  commitments  in agriculture  and in an aggregate  way, manufacturing.  Their
analysis does not include the results of the Uruguay Round in the areas of trade in services, investment, and
intellectual  property.
10prices are significantly  smaller  than earlier  estimates  based on different  stylization  of complete  or
partial  liberalization
The results in scenarios  I and II are based on the assumption  that restraints  on domestic
support will be ineffective. In contrast, scenario IV (column  5) assumes  that domestic  support
restraints will be effective. The benchmark  simulation  used 1989/93 protection  levels for the
period  1994/2002. Where  protection  is negative  (in the case of import subsidies  or export  tax), no
changes  in protection  rates were assumed. As expected,  the price impacts  from scenario  IV show
larger  prices  increases  than in Scenario  I and II.
The last column  are from the FAO study (1995)  based on a partial equilibrium  model  and
excludes  the impact  of manufacturing  liberalization.  The analysis  is based on the detailed  data on
agreed  bound  tariffs rather on stylized  reductions  used in other studies. However,  the FAO study
does not consider the extent of "slippage" due to  the excessive  tariffication and ineffective
disciplines  in domestic  support.  That  is, the FAO study  measures  liberalization  by the reduction  in
the bound  tariff rate.
Overall,  the price changes  from several  simulations  shown  in Table 2 suggest  that world
agricultural  prices relative to the price of  OECD manufacturing  exports are unlikely  to rise
significantly  as a result of the actual outcome of the Round.  The estimates  are significantly
smaller compared  with the price boom in food prices in 1995 following  the completion  of the
Round.  In utilizing  these results,  it is important  to keep  in mind the inherent  difficulty  in defining
the  true counterfactual  rate of protection. Since protection  rates are measured  based on world
prices,  there is a question  of establishing the representative  world  market  prices at the end of the
implementation  period.  Further, as shown by Anderson  and Hayami  (1986), protection  rates in
agriculture  are determined  by economic  variables  and influenced  by the level of development  of a
country. If  the empirical  evidence  of the upward  trend in protection  in some countries  (e.g.  East
Asia and EU) are true and assumed  to continue  in the future, then  the counterfactual rate of
protection  in the absence  of the Round would  be higher  than those assumed in the analyses,  and
the price  impacts  would  be larger. On  the other  hand, it can be argued that the recent fundamental
reforms in many countries,  partly motivated  by factors independent  of the Round,  (e.g. CAP
reforms in EU, liberalization  in certain commodities  in Japan and the Republic of Korea, and
unilateral reforms during structural adjustments  in developing  countries)  represent a structural
change  toward more  world  market integration  and open  economies. Since  many  of  these  reform
began  in early 1990s,  the benchmark  protection  based on 1989-93 have captured  these  changes  to
11a certain  degree. Based on this benchmark,  the estimated  reductions  in protection  resulting  from
the UR would  have been  smaller  and  the impacts  on world  prices  correspondingly  lower.
D.  TRADE  DATA
The welfare  effects  will  partially depend upon the  trading position  in the commodities
affected  by liberalization.  In general, net-food importers  would  be expected to benefit from
reforms which lower the prices of their food imports, and suffer from price increases.' 2 In
aggregate,  total food imports  accounted  for about 8% of LDC total merchandise  imports  over the
1990-93 period. Cereals accounted  for approximately  3%. However, in  some countries (e.g.
Bangladesh,  Egypt, Mozambique),  total food comprised  of 20-25% of total merchandise  imports
during the same  period.
The data on net trade positions (imports-exports)  in value terms are derived  from FAO's
commodity  balance  database (CBD).1 3 The net  trade values used in  the RUNS model are also
based  on this database;  hence,  consistent  commodity  coverage  are ensured. For each primary  and
processed commodities,  the commodity  balance database contains a comprehensive  picture of
the pattern of  a country's commodity  supply and utilization.  The total quantity produced  in a
country  added  to the total quantity  imported  and adjusted  to any change  in stocks  gives  the supply
available. On utilization,  a distinction  is  made between  the quantities  exported,  fed to livestock,
used for seed,  used for manufacturing  and other  uses,  or lost during storage  and transportation,  and
food supplies  available  for human  consumption.  The FAO data on imports  covers all movements
into  the country  of the commodity  in question. In includes  commercial  trade, food aid granted  on
specific terms, and estimates  of unrecorded  trade.' 4 Exports covers all movements  out of the
country  of the commodity  in question. FAO also reports whenever  possible  trade in processed
commodities  expressed  in the originating  primary  commodity  equivalent. For example,  wheat are
imported as bulk grain and/or as processed (e.g. wheat flour, wheat bran, wheat germ, wheat
gluten, etc).  The value of  imports and  exports of  these processed  products in terms of the
12.  However, as indicated by Tyers and Falvey (1989), this  need  not  always be  true in  the case where significant
and multiple distortions exist in the food sub-sectors.
13 The FAO data are based on official country trade statistics on standard trade classification (SITC).  Trade data are
included in both the Commodity Balance Databases  (CBD) and the Supply and Utilization Database or Food Balance
Sheets (SUA).  The difference in the databases mainly concerns the processed products that are expressed in primary
commodity equivalent  in  CBD  whereas in  SUA, trade  accounts are shown  by product  weight,  often in different
detailed  categories.  However, the differences are relatively small  and the grouping "total  food" in CBD are very
similar to those used in the supply and utilization accounts.
14The import data are reported in terms of net weight, i.e. excluding the weight of the container.
12originating primary  commodity equivalent (i.e. wheat equivalent) are  added to  derive the total
wheat and wheat products imports in wheat equivalent.  The actual value (in US$) of net trade is
the difference between imports on a  c.i.f. basis and exports on a f.o.b. basis.
The data on value of imports and exports are aggregated to match the  15 agricultural
commodity categories in the RUNS model.  Given the ambiguity in  the UR Decision as to what
constitutes 'total  food", a  number of definitions are considered.  To  obtain  net expenditures,
"total  food" is  defined following  FAOs  concept of  "basic  foodstuffs"  which  includes  all
potentially edible  commodities, excluding fish.  This is the most comparable to the commodity
categories used in the RUNS  model; total  food includes all  grains, meats,  coffee, cocoa, tea,
vegetable oils, dairy products,  and other foods. For comparison, a  second definition of  "food"
include only  the major  food items (grains, pulses,  livestock products,  fruits  and  vegetables),
excluding tropical  beverages (coffee, cocoa, tea), spices, sugar,  fish, oilseeds and  oils. A third
definition of "food" comprise only of cereal grains. Cereals have traditionally been used as the
indicator of food deficits because it accounts for nearly  60 percent of  total calories consumed in
developing countries.  According to FAO (1995),  it is the most operational of  aU the definitions
due to availability of up-to-date information on  this group of commodities.
The  values of  net  trade expenditures for total food in nearly all developing countries are
presented in  Table  3.  The  data  indicates that  among  125 developing countries, 74  were net
importers and 51 were net  exporters of  total food (including all edible commodities). When only
major food items (cereals, pulses, livestock products, fruits and vegetables) are considered, the
number of  net importers  increases to 88 countries. If "cereals" are used as the indicator, most
developing countries (109 out of 125) are classified as net food importers.
E.  TRADE AND  DOMESTIC  DISTORTIONS  IN LEAST-DEVELOPED  COUNTRIES
As shown in Martin and Winters (1995), the welfare impacts of multilateral liberalization
depend heavily on whether a country  participates in  the liberalization process  and hence reaps
efficiency gains. The studies in Martin and Winters (1995) showed that the regions with the larger
reductions in import prices are generally predicted to achieve larger welfare gains.
In this  section, we look at the tariff  commitments of selected individual least-developed
countries.  The  data  on  applied  tariffs  and  tariff  ceiling  bindings  for  agricultural  products
committed in the URA are shown in Table 4a  and 4b.  Table 4a summarizes the estimated pre-
URA applied rates of protection over 1982-92 with the average tariff bindings given in countries in
13sub-Saharan  Africa (excluding  Nigeria). Table 4b shows  the level of tariff ceiling  bindings  and
other duties and charges  for all agricultural  products. As indicated  by the tariff comniitments,
many least-developed  net-food importing countries were extremely cautious in  their  own
liberalization  commitments  under  the Round.  Except  Nigeria,  which  committed  to reduce  its  rate
of protection  on wheat  and coarse  grains to 150 percent (from 190 and 452 percent  in the 1982-
92 period), very few commitments  to reduce applied protection  were offered.  The data also
indicate  that these countries  left themselves  significant  room to raise applied  protection,  given  the
very  high levels  of tariff  bindings.
At the same time, the UR agreement  is unlikely  to burden least-developed  and net-food
importing  countries  with many new obligations.  This is because  many  of these countries  made no
substantial  liberalization  commitments  on border  protection  either  in other sectors  such as industry
or services.  Moreover,  many of the general  exemptions  for development  and balance-of-payments
support  remain available  for them  to legitimize  trade  restrictions.
The  tariff data are derived  from  the TRAINS,  WTO IDB  database and from the details  of
the PSE and CSE database  developed  by the USDA. Where  PSE and CSE data are not available
for some commodities,  they are  set equal  to zero.
F.  ESTIMATES  OF WELFARE  IMPACTS
The welfare  effects  of world  price changes  resulting  from  the URA  for 14  countries  based
on the comprehensive  measures (terns-of-trade  and distortion  effects) are shown in Table 5. In
addition,  the first-order  terms-of-trade  impacts estimated  for the 54 least-developed  countries  are
shown  in Table 6.  Estimates  based on the baseline  price changes  (scenario  II) and those based on
the largest predicted  price changes (scenario  IV of Goldin et al) are presented. 1 5 All estimates
represent  percent  changes  at the end of the implementation  period.
The results are summarized  as follows. First, as expected,  the small  world  price changes
applied  to a small  proportion  of total expenditures  result in relatively  small (in proportion  to total
GDP)  changes  in welfare  in many  of the least-developed  countries  studied. Only in a few countries
are the estimated  welfare  change constitute  nearly  one or over one percent of GDP.  Among  the
countries  considered,  the largest welfare  change  as a result of agricultural  price shocks  appears  to
15  Detailed estimates for all agricultural products are available upon request.
14occur in Egypt,  where  the welfare  effects  in both scenarios  are estimated  to be above  3 percent of
national  income.
Since  the baseline  price changes  (scenario  II) are less than 10 percent for all agricultural
commodities,  the first-order  terms-of-trade  effects  in the baseline  case are relatively  negligible  in
many  countries. There are some  unexpected  results, however,  under the alternative  scenario  where
even  the partial,  first-order  tenrs-of-trade  effects  represent  more  than  half a percent  of real income.
This reflects  the large price changes  (over 10 percent)  in major import  commodities  such as wheat,
sugar and dairy products. The results for Egypt, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania,
Mozambique,  Nigeria,  Pakistan  and Somalia  stand out in this way. Hence,  if based on the largest
predicted  price changes (scenario IV), the terms-of-trade  effects are shown to increase quite
significantly  in these countries,  compared  with  the baseline  case.
Second,  the distortion  effects  appears  to be  much  larger than the terms-of-trade  effects  in
several  countries. In some  countries,  the distortion  effects  works  in opposition  or have  the opposite
sign as the terms-of-trade  effects. In these cases, the distortion  effects offset the terms-of-trade
impacts  by enough  to reverse  the sign of the welfare  changes. This is most significant  in the case
of Bangladesh  and India. In contrast,  the distortion  effects operates  in addition  or have the same
sign as the terms-of-trade  effects  in several  countries,  thus reinforcing  the terms-of-trade  changes.
In several  countries,  the distortion  effect is large  enough  to push the total welfare  effect  to almost 1
percent  or more  of total GDP. This is true in the case of  Egypt, Kenya,  Pakistan,  Tanzania  and
Zambia.
Third, the trade distortions  measured in terms of tariffs and/or tariff equivalents,  are
important  component  of the distortion  effects in many of  the countries  considered.  The results
indicate  that the larger  the initial  trade distortions,  the larger is the overal welfare  change. This is
true in several  countries,  particularly  Egypt and India, In a number  of cases, the impacts  tends to
result in welfare losses, partly explained  by the loss in tariff revenues  resulting from reduced
imports.  Also,  the terms-of-trade  changes  tend to be welfare  reducing  in countries  where  there the
initial  trade distortions  are  present  in many commodities.
Fourth,  domestic  distortions  represented  by the estimated  producer  and consumer  subsidy
equivalents  (excluding  tariffs and other border measures) are also important  in the nature of
welfare  impacts. In countries  where  the producer  and consumer  subsidy  equivalents  are very large
in important  commodities,  the large domestic  distortions  results in  welfare  losses. This occurred
15in the case of Egypt, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Zambia,  In a number of cases, the small terms-of-
trade losses are reversed into small gains if all domestic distortions are eliminated.
Table  5. Terms-of-Trade  and  Welfare  Chan es In  selected  countries,  Percent.,
Country  Welfare  Effects  Terms-of-Trade  Changes
Scenario  II  Scenario  IV21  Scenario  II  "  Scenario  IV 2'
Bangladesh  0.104  0.414  -0.016  -0.05
India  -0.465  -0.546  0.008  0.03
Pakistan  -1.079  -1.089  -0.053  -0.06
Indonesia  -0.028  -0.039  -0.010  -0.01
Thailand  0.005  0.021  0.012  0.05
Egypt  3.050  3.791  -0.530  -0.65
Kenya  0.970  0.820  0.151  0.14
Morocco  -0.003  0.003  -0.027  0.03
Nigeria  -0.551  -0.621  -0.025  -0.09
Tanzania  1.840  1.320  -0.031  0.15
Turkey  -0.153  -0.110  0.021  0.05
Tunisia  0.031  0.051  0.054  0.065
Zambia  -1.070  -2.280  -0.032  -0.02
Zimbabwe  0.551  0.581  0.065  0.47
1/ Using  price changes  in scenario  II by Goldin,  et. al (1995)
2/ Using  price chnages  in scenario  IV by Goldin,  et. al (1995)
Source: Author's  results.
The results for Egypt provide interesting insights.  Egypt has  large domestic distortions
and has a significant share of GDP based in agriculture.  The level of support  or taxation vary
significantly by  commodity. The largest  taxation  occurs  in cotton,  rice  and  sugar.  Taxes  to
producers exceeded 500 percent of producers revenue in the early 1980s, but has fallen markedly
to  about  170  percent  by  1989.  Aggregate  producer  subsidy  equivalent  for  five  important
commodities (wheat, maize, rice, sugar and cotton), comprising 80 percent of cultivated area was
about  175 percent in 1989, indicating large average taxation.  Egypt is a large net importer of
wheat, coarse grains, sugar, meats, and other foods; and a net exporter of  cotton.  Combined with
the predicted world price declines in rice, cotton and other foods, the impact is to reduce further an
activity which is already below its efficient level (i.e. marginal benefit is above marginal cost).  In
addition, rice had  a large positive consumer subsidy equivalent, with the effect of increasing an
activity which is already above its efficient level.  These distortion effects tend to dominate the
other effects which have opposite signs.
In cases where the distortion effects dominate the welfare loss, the removal of domestic
distortions in a number of countries tend to convert the small terms-of-trade losses to welfare gains
16due to the trade distortion effects, such as in the case of Bangladesh. The terms-of-trade effects in
several countries appears sensitive to the structure and magnitude of price changes. For example,
the terms-of-trade losses are converted to  a small terms-of-trade gain in a  few cases when the
larger price changes based in scenario IV are assumed.
The price increases in wheat and vegetable oils, together with increased prices for coarse
grains and sugar result in adverse terms-of-trade changes particularly in least-developed countries
in Africa and South Asia. This is because many least-developed countries in Africa are net-food
importers particularly  in  wheat, rice,  and  dairy products  but  exporters of  tropical  beverages
(coffee and cocoa), some oilseeds, and some tropical fruits and agricultural raw materials (cotton).
The predicted price  increases in  grains and livestock products  combined with lower prices  for
tropical product exports result in adverse terms-of-trade losses in these countries.  The largest
terms-of-trade loss are estimated for Egypt, at US$35.88 million.  More than 90 percent of  this
income loss is due to higher costs of grains imports, estimated at  US$32 million.
Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Honduras and Ghana will face terms-of-
trade losses at more than US$5 million. The largest estimated terms-of-trade losses are as follows:
Yemen (8.05), Nigeria (6.16), Ghana (5.13), Ethiopia (4.71), Sudan (4.39), Kenya (3.75), Zaire
(2.1), Mali  (1.93), and Mozambique (1.35).  The smallest terms-of-trade loss,  at  less than  0.5
million, are estimated for Rwanda, Madagascar, Gambia, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso
and Comoros.
In South Asia, four countries are least-developed, but the region is largely self-sufficient in
basic cereals, although a net-importer of  wheat.  It is also a net importer of  oilseeds and dairy
products, but a major exporter of tea, cotton, jute, and tobacco.  On balance, small losses in terms-
of-trade are shown in several countries.  The least-developed countries in Southeast and East Asia
have a similar pattern of  trade balance as in South Asia;  with terms-of-trade losses from higher
prices of wheat and coarse grains  more than offset by gains due to potential increases in rice
prices, its major export product.
In  contrast,  terms-of-trade  gains  are  predicted  in  several African  countries  including
Guyana, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Lesotho, Botswana and Maldives. Countries which are
net exporters of beverages (coffee, cocoa, tea) are adversely affected given the predicted decline in
world prices in these commodities.  Egypt, a rice net exporter, will be adversely affected by the
predicted decline in the price of rice.
17Table 6. Impact of the Uruguay Round on Terms-of-Trade  in Agriculture  of Least-Developed  Countries
Terrns of Trade  Tm  Trade  PernLt  of GDP
Scenario  Scenario  Scenario  Scenario
11 1/  IV  2/  11/  IV  2/
Countries  mi US $  mil  US $  Percent  Percent
Bangladesh  1.47  -19.88  -0.02  -0.05
Benin  -1.94  -2.22  -0.10  -0.11
Bhutan  -0.08  -0.49  -0.03  -0.19
Botswana  0.10  1.35  0.00  0.04
Burkina Faso  -1.82  -0.11  -0.07  0.00
Burundi  0.06  1.79  0.01  0.16
Cambodia  0.19  -0.30  0.02  -0.03
Central African  Republic  -0.48  -0.54  -0.04  -0.04
Chad  -1.96  1.09  -0.15  0.09
China  -46.89  78.24  -0.01  0.02
Comoros  -0.16  -0.73  -0.06  -0.29
Egypt  -39.09  -113.10  -0.11  -0.33
Equatorial Guinea  -0.08  -0.36  -0.06  -0.25
Ethiopia  -3.22  -3.08  -0.05  -0.05
Garnbia  -0.51  -4.01  -0.15  -1.19
Ghana  -5.05  -7.01  -0.08  -0.10
Guinea  -0.99  -11.12  -0.03  -0.37
Guinea-Bissau  0.01  -0.80  0.01  -0.35
Guyana  2.12  12.63  0.78  4.66
Haiti  -1.13  -8.03  -0.06  -0.45
Honduras  -4.51  11.01  -0.15  0.36
India  8.90  78.44  0.00  0.03
Indonesia  10.80  12.45  0.01  0.01
Kenya  0.73  11.69  0.01  0.14
Lao PDR  -0.31  -0.44  -0.03  -0.04
Lesotho  0.15  -3.93  0.02  -0.62
Liberia  0.67  -1.83  0.06  -0.16
Madagascar  0.22  3.16  0.01  0.11
Malawi  2.46  12.35  0.13  0.63
Maldives  0.45  -0.70  0.27  -0.42
Mali  -4.37  -0.38  -0.17  -0.01
Mauritania  -1.10  -5.74  -0.10  -0.52
Mozambique  -1.20  -5.44  -0.09  -0.39
Myatnar  -0.20  3.33  0.00  0.01
Namibia  -1.18  -0.81  -0.05  -0.04
Nepal  -0.13  -1.41  0.00  -0.04
Nicaragua  0.56  6.84  0.03  0.40
Niger  -1.41  -3.81  -0.06  -0.16
Nigeria  -5.88  -29.42  -0.02  -0.09
Pakistan  -16.61  -19.16  -0.04  -0.04
Rwanda  0.30  1.35  0.02  0.07
Sao Tome & Principe  -0.07  -0.22  -0.16  -0.46
Sierra Leone  0.56  -2.89  0.07  -0.38
Solomon  Islands  0.25  0.03  0.11  0.01
Somalia  -0.92  -3.16  -0.10  -0.34
SriLanka  -1.70  -4.69  -0.02  -0.05
Sudan  -5.78  0.92  -0.08  0.01
Tanzania  -0.87  4.29  -0.03  0.15
Togo  -1.66  -1.14  -0.10  -0.07
Uganda  -0.01  4.38  0.00  0.15
Viet Nam  -1.05  15.88  -0.01  0.18
Yemen  -8.34  -36.84  -0.10  -0.43
Zaire  -1.61  -5.05  -0.02  -0.06
Zanmbia  -0.91  -0.57  -0.03  -0.02
Zinbabwe  1.87  15.55  0.06  0.47
l/Based onprice changes  in Scenario  ]Iby Goldin, etal.  (1995).
2.Based on price changes  in scenario IV by Goldin, et al. (1995).
Souree  of  basic  data: PAO  Cornrmdity  Balance  Database.
18For a number of reasons, the estimated first-order terns-of-trade  losses may decline if the
effects of distortions are considered.  First,  if governments allow transmission of  the changes in
world prices to domestic prices, local output may rise and some decline in net-food  imports will
occur.  Second, in many least-developed countries, food imports partly occurs due to inappropriate
policies such as  taxes  on  output  and  subsidies on  food  consumption and  imports.  In these
situations, if higher world food prices  are transmitted to  domestic prices,  they  will reduce the
burden of these distortions. In these cases, governments may find it more cost-effective to target
assistance to the poor and not to distort domestic prices for all segments of the population.
Consistent with the results of  Tyers and Falvey (1989) and Anderson (1994, 1996), these
distortion effects may even be large enough to offset the adverse terms-of-trade losses.  Increased
production will raise tax revenue, while lower imports will reduce subsidy costs. More importantly,
if  governments in these  countries reform inappropriate policies, endogenous productivity  may
result from higher profitability  and other dynamic gains from liberalization. If  this  occurs and
supply response expands, some least-developed net-food importers could become net-exporters and
thus benefit directly from higher world prices.
Overall, the results indicates the importance of  more comprehensive welfare measures
based on general equilibrium analysis incorporating the effects of both trade and domestic policy
distortions in  evaluating  the  impacts of  world  agricultural  price  shocks  as  a  result  of  trade
liberalization.  The results  for  individual  countries, while not very  sensitive to  the  elasticity
measures, are sensitive to the sign and magnitude of domestic and trade distortions.  Because of
data constraints, the more comprehensive welfare measures are only estimated for a few countries.
Future  efforts  to  develop quality  databases  about  trade  and  domestic  policy  distortions  in
developing  countries  will  be  important  to  adequately  assess  the  welfare  effects  of  future
multilateral reforms.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The welfare effects of  the agricultural price shocks resulting from the Uruguay Round for
least-developed and net-food importing countries are evaluated in this paper.  The analysis provide
further evidence that the nature of welfare changes are significantly affected by the structure of
trade  and domestic distortions present  in the  economy. The  first-order terms-of-trade changes
indicate that while many countries are adversely affected due to increases in world prices, the net
increase are small relative to total GDP. It  is  likely that even the small terms-of-trade losses will
19have negative impact on some segments of the population in least-developed countries.  In food-
deficit countries where there are certain vulnerable population groups, the potential adverse effects
should not be ignored.  However, the  negative  impacts can be partly outweighed  by  domestic
policy reforms designed to improve agricultural efficiency and productivity and by other areas of
reform in other sectors under the Round.
The  results  demonstrate  the  potential  benefits  of  removing  the  trade  and  domestic
distortions to offset the terms-of-trade losses resulting from agricultural trade liberalization. Many
of the least-developed and low-income food-deficit countries tax  their agricultural  sector either
implicitly by giving higher protection to industry, or more explicitly by taxing exports of many
commodities or by maintaining government controlled domestic prices below world prices.  In the
longer-run, the agreed UR reforms and any further unilateral reduction of agricultural support and
protection  in  the  industrial  countries  could have  a  dynamic  impact  on  the  development of
agricultural production and could provide these countries with an opportunity to expand foreign
exchange earnings from their agricultural exports. Higher prices would improve the profitability of
the farning  sector in some countries and reduce government expenditures on agricultural income
support programs in others.  More remunerative prices in the long-run could contribute to making
food production in food- deficit countries more attractive.
Although not all, many least-developed countries did not use the UR to support domestic
efforts at trade an domestic policy refonm.  As shown in many studies,  most of the gains from UR
come  from  countries'  own  liberalization  efforts.  Thus,  by  making  zero  or  very  limited
liberalization commitments, countries have lost one opportunity for  efficiency  gains.  Given the
limited outcome of  the UR  agreement  in own  liberalization of  least- developed countries, the
extent of structural reform  and trade  liberalization in  these countries will depend on unilateral
initiatives  taken  independently or in  the context of  World Bank or IMF programs.  Unless
further liberalization and structural reforms are pursued, the ability of  these countries  to take
advantage of  the  arising market opportunities in their  more open export  markets  may  also be
lost.
The World Bank is attentive to the problems of Least-Developed and Net Food-Importers,
monitoring their situation both in the context of world food markets and through its regular country
dialogue, technical assistance and lending programs. In general, the priority that a country receives
for World Bank lending is deternined by its overall need and the contribution that the Bank can
make to  its  long-term development. The World Bank  Group is  working to  raise  agricultural
20productivity  in least-developed  net-food  importing countries  by encouraging  rural development
through  a wide  variety of measures  and  programs. Bank  lending  and  technical  assistance  programs
for rural  development  in  these countries include (1)  encouraging appropriate policies and
strategies;  (2) enhancing  food supplies  through intensification  of production  systems  and through
sound  natural  resource  management;  (3) improving  access  to food; and (4) improving  utilization  of
food.  Key elements  of the strategy include supporting  government  policies and strategies that
encourage  investment  and growth, and which do not discriminate  against agriculture  and small
farmers;  promoting  better technology  and production  techniques;  investing  in infrastructure  and
people, and promoting appropriate  macroeconomic  policies and institutions.  In FY96, Bank
lending  for agriculture  and rural development  was one of the largest single lending  sectors, with
commitments  totaling  $2,576.7  million  (in 1992  prices). Nearly  one-third  of the  total was given  to
low-income  countries.  During 1991-95,  the countries  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  received  about 40
percent  of the Bank Group's  total agricultural  sector  adjustment  lending.
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22Table 1. Average  Import  Price Reductions,  percent 1/
COUNTRY/REGION  WHEAT  RICE  COARSE  SUGAR  MEAT  OILSEEDS  DAIRY
GRAINS
BUROPEANUNION  - - - - -12
UNITED STATES  -15  - - - - -
JAPAN  -81  -91  -47  -33  - -14
AUSTRAUA  - -4  - - - -1  -19
CANADA  - - - - - -
EFrA  - - 0  -14  - -18
UPPER INCOME ASIA  -106  - -76  -7  -44  -5
INDONESIA  - --  - -33
INDIA  - - - - - -3
LOW-INCOME  ASIA  - -
BRAZIL  -31  - -
MEBXCO  - - - - - -1  -
OTHER  LATIN  AMBRICA  - - - -
NIGERIA  -12  - -16  -
MED1TERRANEAN  - - -
OTHBER  AFRICA  - - - - - - -
SOUTH AFRICA  - - - - - - -
MAGHREB-
1/  Calculated as change  intanffrate  dividedby  the power  ofthe  initial tariffrate.  Wherethepost-UR  rate is greaterthanthe  counterfactuaI
rate, a zero  pricereduction is assumed,  indicated  by (-).
2/ Japan delayed taiffication  in rice.
Source:  Ingco,  1995.
Table  2.  Impact  of  Uruguay  Round  liberalization  on  world  agricultural  prices  (percentage  change  from
benchmark  levels  at the  end  of  implementation  period).
Commodities  Brandao  &  Goldin,  Goldin,  Goldin,  Goldin,  FAO
Martin  (1993)  et.al.  et.al.  et.al.  et.al  1995
Dunkel  (1993)  (1995)  (1995)  (1995)
scenario  Scenario  I  Scenario  II  Scenario  IV
79-93  base  89-93  base  (with  no
slippage)
Wheat  6.18  5.9  1.2  3.8  10.3  7.0
Rice  4.02  -1.9  -1.5  -0.9  3.6  7.0
Coarse  grains  3.30  3.6  0.1  2.3  5.4  4.0
Sugar  9.92  10.2  -1.0  1.8  11.4  na
Beef  & veal  7.16  4.7  0.2  0.6  6.0  8.0
Otbier  meats  4.02  1.0  -0.9  -0.6  2.3  na
Coffee  1.35  -6.1  -1.7  -1.5  -0.7  na
Cocoa  0.90  -4.0  -1.3  -0.7  0.3  na
Tea  2.66  3.0  -1.6  -1.4  0.9  na
Vegetable  Oils  3.77  4.1  -0,6  -0.3  5.4  4.0
Dairy  12.18  7.2  -1.3  1.2  12.1  7.0
Other  Foods  1.33  -1.7  -1.3  -1.4  -0.7  na
Cotton  1.82  3.7  -1.1  -1.2  1.2  na
Other  Agriculture  2.62  5.9  -0.5  0.8  2.9  na
Sources:  Brandao  and  Martin,  1993;  Goldin  and  van  der  Mensbrugghe,  1995;  FAO,  1995;  Martin  and  Winters,  1995.
23Table 3. NetTrade  Balance(kaports-Bxports),  Average 1990-93,MillionUS$
Categogy  Iotat  (ereals,Lvst  Cereals  Categogy  Total  Cereals,Lvst  Cereala
Country  Food  *  Pulses  **  Cuntry  Food *  Pue**  ***
SaudiArabia  3421  2484  717  Mali  hfd  18  -18  31
Rep. of Korea  2226  1945  1348  Guinea-Bissau  hfd  17  11  17
Algeria  2211  1464  728  Suriname  16  -10  -15
Bgypt  ]ifd  2209  1294  1019  Cambodia  lifd  15  13  12
Portugal  1991  990  407  Grenada  15  12  3
IranlslamicRep  1843  1005  915  Samoa  lifd  15  8  3
UnrtedArabmrsirates  1075  784  88  CentralAfricanRep  lifd  12  8  7
Mexico  1500  848  913  Senegal  lifd  7  249  141
Spain  1339  -1951  290  Papua New Guinea  lifd  4  150  62
Libya  1257  675  403  Sao Tome & Pincipe  lifd  3  4  3
Iraq  1146  727  452  Malawi  lifd  1  67  55
Yugoslavia  767  308  -1  Mongolia  lifd  -5  -28  11
Romsnia  731  314  192  Laos  lifd  -10  -5  8
Venezuela  713  441  232  Chad  lifd  -11  -19  11
Yemen  hfd  704  485  305  Maldives  lifd  -12  15  5
Nigeria  hifd  686  414  185  Dormnica  lifd  -13  111  99
Greece  670  291  -159  SaintLucia  -14  -28  6
Lebanon  595  349  83  Zimbabwe  lifd  -21  22  50
Kuwait  569  421  53  Rwanda  lifd  -31  24  7
Pakistan  lifd  569  13  -39  Nicaragua  lifd  -33  20  42
Jordan  lifd  554  355  221  Namibia  -32  -47  14
Angola  lifd  520  237  63  Bolivia  lifd  -33  33  53
Bangladesr  lifd  354  346  202  Belize  -46  -10  4
Israel  266  -150  277  SriLarika  lifd  -46  219  166
Syria  lifd  266  -26  0  Burundi  lifd  -47  17  6
Mozarmbique  hfd  192  140  124  SaintVincent  -49  -38  -4
Haiti  tfd  189  126  91  Mauritania  lifd  -54  42  51
Morocco  lifd  175  -106  275  Tanzania  lifd  -67  15  33
Malta  169  114  21  Peru  lifd  -78  387  341
Botswana  169  65  36  E1 Salvador  lifd  -98  98  47
Bahamas  151  134  10  Fiji  -109  55  -23
BruneiDaresalam  150  96  16  Uganda  lifd  -113  1  -1
Trinidad&Tobago  132  137  45  Myanmar  -117  -123  -47
Albania  131  95  58  Guyana  -119  -1  -14
Gabon  130  96  23  Cameroon  lifd  -121  73  52
Lesotho  lifd  129  87  19  Swaziland  -128  13  14
Zaire  lifd  128  163  73  Madagascar  lifd  -132  17  29
Guinea  lifd  118  150  63  Ghana  lfd  -153  125  76
Congo  lifd  107  79  25  Panama  -175  -125  26
Bthiopia  lifd  84  166  148  MaLrritius  -188  132  40
Burkina Faso  lifd  83  66  46  Paraguay  -237  -79  -13
SierraLeone  hfd  79  77  47  Bulgaria  -262  -328  -14
Afghanistan  lifd  79  -1  61  South Africa  -357  -314  182
Benin  iEfd  76  65  40  Kenya  -391  -29  65
liberia  lifd  76  62  47  Philippines  lifd  -451  263  316
Sudan  lifd  65  91  129  Poland  -493  -634  58
Gamrbia  lifd  63  35  21  Honduras  lifd  -503  -336  30
Barbados  62  60  14  Guaternala  lifd  -509  -62  62
Cyprus  61  -14  62  Uruguay  -545  -487  -104
Zambia  lifd  54  50  49  CostaRica  -750  -483  53
Niger  lifd  53  18  34  Viet Nam  -763  -345  -269
Djibouti  liEfd  51  30  12  Cote dIvoire  lifd  -928  187  137
1onisia  48  143  148  Ecuador  lifd  -1241  -547  77
Togo  lifd  43  37  is  Malaysia  -1543  705  486
CapeVerde  lifd  43  23  11  Indonesia  lifd  -1685  316  442
DominicanRep  lifd  40  111  99  Colombia  -1775  -269  149
Czechosloyvaia  40  -265  10  Chile  -1878  -895  75
Jamaica  37  83  69  India  lifd  -2123  -369  -230
AntiguaandfBarbuda  35  21  2  Cbina  -4175  -1837  1746
Somalia  hfd  28  17  61  Brazil  -5470  -613  854
Nepal  hfd  24  -1  4  Thailand  -5474  -2763  -1251
Seychelles  22  21  5  Argentina  -6565  -3107  -1352
Solommnlslands  19  13  8
Source: FAO  Comnmodity  Balances Database
*  Total food  include all edible commodities
*  Includes cereals, pulses, roots and tubers,  and livestockproducts  and fruits and vegetables
sat  Includes wheat and wheatflours  in wbeat equivalent, coarse grains and rice
Table  4a. Averae  AppLied Rates of Border  Protection  and UR Tariff Bindings in Sub-Sabaran  Africa.
Food  Commodity  Applied  Protection,  %  UR Tariff  Binding,  % *
Wheat  -1  135
Rice  2  166
Coarse  Grains  -15  133
Sugar  16  100
Oilseeds  -19  162
*Excludes  additionalchrs
Source:  See lngco  (1995)  for more  details.
24Table 4b.  Tariff Ceiling Bindings and Other Duties in Agricultural Products in selected Least-
Developed Countries
Countries  Tariff Ceiling  Bindings,  %  Other  Duties & Charges,  %
Bahrain  35  2
Cameroon  80  230
Cote d'Ivoire  4, 64  200
Gabon  60  200
Ghana  40, 99  15
Kenya  62, 100  0
Madagascar  30  250
Mauritius  37, 82, 122  17
Nigeria  150  80
Senegal  30  150
Zimbabwe  25, 150  15
Antigua & Barbuda  100, 130
Belize  100, 110,
Brunei Darusalam  20, 50
Dominica  100
Guyana  100  40
Jamaica  100  80, 200
St. Lucia  100, 130
St. Vincent  100, 130
Trinidad & Tobago  100, 106, 110,126,156  15
Swaziland  0-597
Source: WTO Country Schedule of  URA Tariff Commitments
25Table 6a. Impact of the  Uruguay Round on Food Terms of Trade of Least-Developed Countries
Terms  of Trade Effects  Percent of GDP
Scenario  Scenario  Scenario  Scenario
111  IV 2/  I11/  1V 2/
Countries  Commodity  Mil  US $  Mil  us  $  Percent  Percent
(4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Bangladesh  Total Food  -1.75  -24.14  -0.01  -0.10
Benin  Total Food  -0.53  -3.60  -0.03  -0.18
Bhutan  Total Food  -0.07  -0.48  -0.03  -0.18
Botswana  TotalFood  0.30  1.42  0.01  0.04
BurkinaFaso  TotalFood  -0.21  -3.13  -0.01  -0.11
Burundi  Total Food  -0.59  -0.51  -0.05  -0.04
Cambodia  Total Food  0.07  -0.75  0.01  -0.07
Central African Republic  Total Food  -0.33  -1.12  -0.03  -0.09
Chad  Total Food  -0.83  -0.79  -0.07  -0.06
China  TotalFood  -71.77  14.60  -0.01  0.00
Comoros  Total Food  -0.16  -0.84  -0.06  -0.34
Egypt  Total Food  -35.88  -111.49  -0.10  -0.32
Equatorial Guinea  Total Food  -0.05  -0.40  -0.04  -0.29
Ethiopia  Total Food  -4.71  -8.22  -0.07  -0.13
Gam-bia  Total Food  -0.34  -3.77  -0.10  -1.12
Ghana  TotalFood  -5.13  -7.20  -0.08  -0.11
Guinea  Total Food  0.05  -5.08  0.00  -0.17
Guinea-Bissau  Total Food  0.04  -0.82  0.02  -0.36
Guyana  Total Food  1.98  12.04  0.73  4.44
Haiti  Total Food  -1.30  -9.60  -0.07  -0.53
Honduras  Total Food  -5.92  5.79  -0.19  0.19
India  TotalFood  -1.83  20.63  0.00  0.01
Indonesia  Total Food  -17.94  -45.00  -0.02  -0.04
Kenya  TotalFood  -3.75  -3.09  -0.05  -0.04
Kenya  Total Food  -0.42  -1.11  -0.04  -0.11
Lesotho  Total Food  0.32  -3.62  0.05  -0.57
Liberia  Total Food  0.44  -2.68  0.04  -0.24
Madagascar  Total Food  -0.37  0.77  -0.01  0.03
Malawi  Total Food  -0.50  1.87  -0.03  0.09
Maldives  Total Food  0.25  -1.52  0.15  -0.91
Mali  TotalFood  -1.93  -4.97  -0.08  -0.20
Mauritania  Total Food  -1.39  -7.76  -0.12  -0.70
Mozarmbique  Total Food  -1.35  -7.02  -0.10  -0.51
Myanmar  Total Food  -0.57  1.51  0.00  0.00
Namibia  Total Food  -1.15  -0.58  -0.05  -0.03
Nepal  Total Food  -0.06  -1.43  0.00  -0.05
Nicaragua  Total Food  0.52  3.49  0.03  0.20
Niger  TotalFood  -1.22  -3.69  -0.05  -0.15
Nigeria  Total Food  -6.16  -30.98  -0.02  -0.09
Pakistan  Total Food  -8.58  -25.15  -0.02  -0.06
Rwanda  Total Food  -0.37  -1.11  -0.02  -0.06
Sao Tome & Principe  Total Food  -0.06  -0.19  -0.12  -0.40
SierraLeone  Total Food  0.46  -3.42  0.06  -0.44
Solomon Islands  Total Food  0.11  -0.44  0.05  -0.20
Somalia  TotalFood  -0.99  -3.55  -0.11  -0.39
Sri Lanka  Total Food  -6.25  -21.65  -0.07  -0.24
Sudan  Total Food  -4.39  -5.62  -0.06  -0.08
Tanzania  Total Food  -0.85  -1.42  -0.03  -0.05
Togo  Total Food  -0.60  -2.26  -0.04  -0.14
Uganda  Total Food  -1.01  0.30  -0.03  0.01
VietNam  TotalFood  -4.53  10.41  -0.05  0.12
Yenen  Total Food  -8.05  -40.24  -0.09  -0.47
Zaire  TotalFood  -2.10  -6.74  -0.02  -0.08
Zamnbia  Total Food  -0.86  -0.70  -0.03  -0.02
Zimbabwe  Total Food  -1.10  1.55  -0.03  0.05
l/Based  onpricechanges  inScenario  n by Goldin,  et al.  (1995).
26Table 6b.  Impact  of the Uruguay Round  on  Tenms-of-Trade in Agriculture  of Least-Developed  Countries
Terms  of Trae  of Trade  Percent  of  GDP
Scenario  Scenario  Scenario  Scenario
I  1/  IV 2/  1  1/  IV 2/
Countries  mil US $  mit US $  Percent  Percent
Bangladesh  1.47  -19.88  -0.02  -0.05
Benin  -1.94  -2.22  -0.10  -0.11
Bhutan  -0.08  -0.49  -0.03  -0.19
Botswana  0.10  1.35  0.00  0.04
BurkinaFaso  -1.82  -0.11  -0.07  0.00
Burnmdi  0.06  1.79  0.01  0.16
Cambodia  0.19  -0.30  0.02  -0.03
Central A -ican  Republic  -0.48  -0.54  -0.04  -0.04
Chad  -1.96  1.09  -0.15  0.09
China  -46.89  78.24  -0.01  0.02
Comoros  -0.16  -0.73  -0.06  -0.29
Egypt  -39.09  -113.10  -0.11  -0.33
Equatorial  Guinea  -0.08  -0.36  -0.06  -0.25
Ethiopia  -3.22  -3.08  -0.05  -0.05
Gambia  -0.51  -4.01  -0.15  -1.19
Ghana  5.05  -7.01  -0.08  -0.10
Guinea  -0.99  -11.12  -0.03  -0.37
Guinea-Bissau  0.01  -0.80  0.01  -0.35
Guyana  2.12  12.63  0.78  4.66
Haiti  -1.13  -8.03  -0.06  -0.45
Honduras  -4.51  11.01  -0.15  0.36
India  8.90  78.44  0.00  0.03
Indonesia  10.80  12.45  0.01  0.01
Kenya  0.73  11.69  0.01  0.14
Lao PDR  -0.31  -0.44  -0.03  -0.04
Lesotho  0.15  -3.93  0.02  -0.62
Liberia  0.67  -1.83  0.06  -0.16
Madagascar  0.22  3.16  0.01  0.11
Malawi  2.46  12.35  0.13  0.63
Maldives  0.45  -0.70  0.27  -0.42
Mali  -4.37  -0.38  -0.17  -0.01
Mauritania  -1.10  -5.74  -0.10  -0.52
Mozambique  -1.20  -5.44  -0.09  -0.39
Myanmar  -0.20  3.33  0.00  0.01
Namibia  -1.18  -0.81  -0.05  -0.04
Nepal  -0.13  -1.41  0.00  -0.04
Nicaragua  0.56  6.84  0.03  0.40
Niger  -1.41  -3.81  -0.06  -0.16
Nigeria  -5.88  -29.42  -0.02  -0.09
Pakistan  -16.61  -19.16  -0.04  -0.04
Rwanda  0.30  1.35  0.02  0.07
Sao Tome & Principe  -0.07  -0.22  -0.16  -0.46
Sierra Leone  0.56  -2.89  0.07  -0.38
Solomonlslands  0.25  0.03  0.11  0.01
Somalia  -0.92  -3.16  -0.10  -0.34
Sri Lanka  -1.70  -4.69  -0.02  -0.05
Sudan  -5.78  0.92  -0.08  0.01
Tanzania  -0.87  4.29  -0.03  0.15
Togo  -1.66  -1.14  -0.10  -0.07
Uganda  -0.01  4.38  0.00  0.15
VietNam  -1.05  15.88  -0.01  0.18
Yemen  -8.34  -36.84  -0.10  -0.43
Zaire  -1.61  -5.05  -0.02  -0.06
Zambia  -0.91  -0.57  -0.03  -0.02
Zimbabwe  1.87  15.55  0.06  0.47
I/Based  on price changes  in Scenario II by Goldin, et al.  (1995).
2/Based on pnice  changes in scenario IV by Goldin, et al.  (1995).
Source of  basic data:  FAO Comxmdity  Balance  Database.
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